Climate policy in times of crisis
© picture alliance / ASSOCIATED PRESS | Sergei Grits
On 23 November, the 29th UN Climate Conference came to a close in Baku. Our Germanwatch experts were there. In this blog article, they report on the difficult negotiations, detail the most important decisions, and draw conclusions on the climate conference in times of crisis. What was (not) achieved? And what needs to happen before COP30 in Belém next year?
- Mixed emotions: climate policy in times of crisis
- Dynamics of the negotiations in Baku
- Azerbaijan’s COP Presidency
- Climate finance – too little, too late
- Nationally Determined Contributions almost without ambition
- Climate change mitigation and the energy transition: emergency brake prevents setbacks
- The Just Transition Work Programme failed to make progress
- The Global Goal on Adaptation: procedural progress, unmet needs and growing global risks
- An unsuccessful COP for loss and damage
- Food systems on everyone’s lips?
Summary
Mixed emotions: climate policy in times of crisis
The outcome of COP29 in Baku conjures up very mixed feelings, which is hardly surprising given the existential challenges that still remain unresolved. In this crucial decade, finance for climate change mitigation and adaptation in low-income countries was not pushed to anywhere near the necessary sum. The result has been one of frustration. Negotiators faced great difficulties in getting high-income countries to agree to the necessary amount. Finance ministers and heads of government clearly did not understand the need for these investments for the future. Nevertheless, each euro effectively invested in climate change mitigation and adaptation saves substantially more in terms of loss and damage. Investing in the future is also a pre-requisite for Europe to be able to use its regulatory model to uphold the multilateral framework for human rights and a good life for all. Investing in the future therefore forms part of an active peace and security policy.
On the other hand, it was welcomed with relief that a multilateral COP agreement for more, albeit insufficient, momentum was possible. This is in spite of an increasingly difficult political situation globally. However, the fact that many low-income countries approved an outcome that for them was disappointing was primarily due to the perception that political willingness for change is likely to be even lower in 2026. It is already becoming clear that the South and North will now have to defend what they have achieved together, in particular the roadmap for growth. These hard-won achievements are opposed by governments of the ‘us first’ camp that only have the supposed welfare of their own populations in mind.
There was anger once again at the fact that 80% of the money needed had not been pledged by the end of the conference. A replenishment plan was missing. Additionally, adaptation finance was not clearly secured, let alone loss and damage finance. Furthermore the role of high-income countries as leaders was vague.
Some relief was provided as a group from Brazil, Kenya, Colombia, the United Kingdom, and Germany at least negotiated concrete steps towards a roadmap in the text. At least USD 300 billion in climate finance by 2035 has now been agreed upon. Next year, governments have to decide on a roadmap to achieve an increase to USD 1.3 trillion by 2035. Innovative financial instruments such as levies on international aviation and shipping are also to be promoted. And a review will be carried out in five years’ time, which could ultimately lead to a more appropriate financial target. Hopefully with the support of a constructive US government.
A direct and quick start to better finance will be decisive for the global climate and the political mood between South and North. This must benefit the implementation plans for Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) in low-income countries. Next year, the community of states should also show that they are actually putting the envisaged growth process into operation.
Two global arenas for the geopolitical climate debate
1. The fight for a good life and human rights for everyone
What is at stake is nothing less than a good life and human rights for everyone. Transformative progress in climate change mitigation and adaptation are therefore becoming increasingly important. Particularly so for the millions of people living in low-income countries, who are the hardest hit by the climate crisis. Every euro that goes into climate change mitigation, resilient ecosystems and societies now can prevent a multitude of damage. The structural injustice of economic and financial structures must also come to an end. Yet, an increasing number of states are pursuing a policy of ‘us first and then the others can see where they are’. The fight for fair global structures, which is already advancing at a snail’s pace, is increasingly on the defensive.
2. The fight to end the fossil fuel business model
As the world’s largest emitter by far China, and therefore probably also the world, is on the verge of peak fossil fuel emissions. In addition, renewable energy and the electrification of traffic and buildings are growing exponentially. Coal, oil and gas as a business model will therefore soon be in decline. Worldwide, we have seen how states, sectors and companies that live off fossil fuel exports have been fighting fiercely to prolong the fossil fuel business model. Numerous examples prove this: Trump’s election was largely funded by fossil fuel lobbyists. After the election of right-wing libertarian President Milei, the fossil fuel energy sector in Argentina recently generated a trade surplus worth billions of dollars (USD 2.93 billion after a deficit of USD 1.1 billion the year before Milei’s election). In many parts of the world, there is an electoral affinity between authoritarian governance, right-wing populism, and the rejection of climate change mitigation.
The geopolitical climate debate at COP
These geopolitical conflict situations also had an impact on the COP in Baku. One of its focal points on the one hand was the new collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG). As well as moving away from the fossil fuel pathway, the NCQG is aimed at enabling poorer low-income countries in particular and the more impoverished people there to quickly meet their development needs effectively and affordably. However, people in these countries must also adapt to the consequences of climate change and protect themselves from extreme weather events, which are becoming more frequent and more severe. Support is also needed to deal with the resulting loss and damage. At the COP, these issues were discussed in a global political setting, in which governments are increasingly pushing responsibility for others in the world to one side.
On the other hand, the central success of COP28 had to be defended and consolidated to tackle the phasing down of fossil fuels together. Saudi Arabia in particular, supported in part by Russia, tried to prevent any progress on climate change mitigation, and was also repeatedly supported by Azerbaijan’s COP Presidency in a very one-sided manner procedurally. In the end, the Presidency even served up a proposal full of setbacks, against the will of the majority of Parties. Some of the countries whose very existence is threatened by climate change then pulled the emergency brake. The proposed text was then rejected and will be renegotiated at the next climate summit.
The EU’s climate policy role in the new global political setting
The energy transition is in the fast lane globally. Above all in G20 countries although with money and swift support it will soon be the case in many low-income countries too. We are currently in the reactionary period of an energy revolution. Germany and the EU can only tackle the climate crisis if they show leadership together with other actors. This can be achieved by means of:
- Co-operation with US states, municipalities, and companies. They can curb the destructive power of the Trump government.
- A new climate policy relationship with China. The new superpower took a more constructive stance at the climate summit than most previous ones. With the next five-year plan and new climate targets, the world’s largest emitter will soon be making decisions about the future. The EU should therefore create a favourable environment for constructive decisions in China as soon as possible, namely through forward-looking climate targets for 2040 and an ambitious NDC. In Baku, China and the EU have been co-ordinating regularly. It is now important to build on this with climate policy co-operation and strike a balance between economic competition and regulatory ideas.
- Expanding strategic co-operation with numerous countries in the Global South. Germany and the EU should build on their many energy and climate partnerships to achieve the rapid implementation of climate change mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage on the ground and in negotiations.
- Expanding strategic co-operation with Brazil in particular. Next year will be a pivotal year for international climate policy. Brazil will play a key role in this, as it will take on the presidency of both the climate summit and the BRICS countries in 2025, following its G20 presidency in 2024.
Dynamics of the negotiations in Baku
The COP agenda was debated even before negotiations began. On behalf of the BASIC group, China proposed adding ‘climate-change-related unilateral restrictive trade measures’ to the agenda, in particular to resolve its concerns regarding the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. There were also differing opinions as to whether the UAE dialogue agenda item should include all results of the global stocktake or only topics related to finance. After hours of discussions, the Presidency moved trade measures from the agenda to presidency consultations. The solution for the UAE dialogue was a footnote that essentially allowed for both options (only finance or all areas).
On days two and three of the COP, around 80 heads of state and government took part in the world leaders summit, above all from African countries and small island states. Several notable names were absent for more or less obvious reasons, including Lula (for health reasons), Scholz (due to political turmoil in Germany), and Macron (in light of the tensions with Azerbaijan and French support for Armenia). In the first week of technical negotiations, there were numerous sessions on different agenda items and several text iterations. With the exception of Article 6 on carbon markets, the progress made however was very limited. There are three main factors that can explain the slow or lacking progress:
- The unwillingness of high-income countries to budge in the negotiations on the NCQG, including the refusal to specify the level of the target (how much money).
- The unwillingness of some oil-rich and emerging economies to accept wording to phase out fossil fuels (MWP and UAE dialogue), especially the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs), including China and in particular Saudi Arabia.
- The COP Presidency’s approach to negotiations, which proved to be unusually one-sided and barely participatory, particularly with regard to constructive proposals from the Parties on how to deal with differences and especially with regard to the poorest and most vulnerable countries.
The quick consensus reached regarding Articles 6.2, 6.4, and 6.8 represents a milestone in the negotiations that have been ongoing since the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015. There are however concerns regarding Article 6.4 in particular, although the outcome document was better compared to texts at previous COPs. Article 6.4 relates to a new international carbon market for the private sector and countries. The current decision cannot guarantee the environmental integrity, meaning there is a risk that more CO2 emissions may be produced than stated.
The environment and climate ministers arrived in the second week. This marked the start of the political phase of the summit. There was considerable pressure to persuade the countries to compromise on their firm positions. The Presidency assigned the issues at hand to pairs of ministers from the Global South and North in order to drive the negotiations forward. In addition, the Presidency sought support for general diplomatic efforts from Brazil and the United Kingdom, hosts of COP30 and COP26 respectively.
The negotiations focused on contentious agenda items, namely the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG), the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP), the Global Stocktake dialogue (UAE dialogue), and the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA). The Presidency had previously presented new texts on most of the topics. At the same time, texts of an unclear status were circulating. The suspicion arose that results were being influenced unilaterally or even that the entire process was being derailed. For example, a single country (Saudi Arabia) was given direct access to a draft resolution from which, among other things, the goal of phasing out fossil fuels, a key negotiating point, disappeared. At the same time, small island states and the lowest-income countries were systematically ignored due to questionable process management. The negotiations dragged on over the weekend, characterised by shuttle diplomacy and many discussions behind closed doors, particularly in relation to the NCQG. As at previous COPs, heavy pressure was exerted in the final straight within and between the groups of countries to push through, or amend, the proposals on the table.
In the final plenary session, the decision on a new finance target was pushed through by COP29 President Mukhtar Babayev. This was met with strong reactions from developing countries, including India, which rejected the resolution. Shortly afterwards, the very weak resolution on the UAE dialogue was raised. As it amounted to a step backwards, Chile was the first to declare a lack of consensus followed by many other countries, especially the most vulnerable. This postponed the UAE dialogue to the Bonn Climate Conference in June and an agreement to the COP30 in November 2025.
Azerbaijan’s COP Presidency
Azerbaijan’s COP Presidency did not fulfil its role as a mediator and guiding force to lead the conference to a good outcome. Its approach was not transparent or inclusive and it was ignorant of the concerns of particularly vulnerable groups of countries. Texts were presented without consulting important country groups beforehand, especially countries of the Global South. The group of least developed countries therefore walked out of the negotiations at times. Negotiated points or ministerial proposals were deleted from texts. Azerbaijan proved to be inexperienced and overstretched in conducting the negotiations. The country had never previously been involved in the endgame of the negotiations.
The Presidency itself referred to its approach as ‘shock diplomacy’. This ‘diplomacy’ was intended to bring together negotiating parties that have significantly different stances in the negotiation of documents. Coupled with long delays, this massively reduced the scope for negotiating an ambitious outcome. Indications are that Azerbaijan did not intend to achieve real success in the negotiations and therefore deliberately violated the rules of UN diplomacy. For example, negotiating texts were sent to oil and gas countries such as Saudi Arabia for editing, while other negotiating parties only received final versions, if at all. Even before the COP, there were considerable human rights concerns regarding the suitability of the authoritarian state as host. Azerbaijan has been demonstrably suppressing the media and civil society for a long time. The country came to host the COP on the condition that it conclude a peace treaty with Armenia, which it has still not done. In future, the UNFCCC should establish clear criteria under international law for COP hosts:
- No obvious disregard for the objectives of the Paris Agreement, which is binding under international law.
- Protection of the human rights of all COP participants and those who direct climate change mitigation demands to the international community or their own state.
- Opportunities for protests by international and national civil society not only in the Blue Zone, but at least also in the Green Zone, without repression, neither on site nor retroactively.
The availability of substantial financial resources should not be one of the criteria for taking on the COP Presidency. If smaller, ambitious countries want to host a COP, they should be supported accordingly, as occurred in 2017 when Fiji hosted the COP in Bonn.
Negotiating topics
Climate finance – too little, too late
As expected, climate finance negotiations dominated the conference in Baku. Difficult negotiations brought the COP to the brink of failure, especially the climax of the deliberations on the definition of the NCQG. The views of the contracting parties differed too widely and here, too, the COP Presidency behaved in a highly problematic manner. In the early hours of the morning, after 30 additional hours of deliberation, an agreement was finally reached.
For the first time in over 15 years, the COP29 Parties set a new target for climate finance. High-income countries must take the lead to mobilise at least USD 300 billion annually by 2035 to support low-income countries in mitigating climate change and adaptation. Low-income countries are encouraged to make their contributions on a voluntary basis.
The participants also jointly recognised that at least USD 1.3 trillion per year is needed to support climate change mitigation measures in low-income countries. The Baku-Belém Roadmap was drawn up to define the necessary pathway. This aims to increase the mobilisation of financial resources from public and private sources to USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035. The implementation of the NCQG decision will be regularly assessed as part of the Global Stocktake, including a special review in 2030.
In addition to the NCQG, the increase in funding for adaptation was also discussed. In this regard, the Adaptation Fund was able to secure almost USD 130 million of its USD 300 million target for resource mobilisation.
In general, the financial commitments announced in Baku fell to a record low. In addition to contributions to the Adaptation Fund, the Green Climate Fund received an additional pledge of around USD 763 million from Sweden. The Loss and Damage Fund received additional pledges from New Zealand (approximately USD 5 million), Sweden (approximately USD 19 million), and Australia (approximately USD 32 million).
A weak compromise in the face of urgent needs
The outcome of the COP is disappointing across the board with regard to climate finance. The decision on the NCQG falls short of what is needed and delivers less than many stakeholders had hoped for after three years of technical dialogues, negotiations, and consultations between Parties. In an increasingly polarised world, where more and more countries are putting their own populations first, the outcome was within the realms of possibility. Fears that international conditions could deteriorate further next year were one of the reasons why many low-income countries felt obliged to accept the unsatisfactory outcome. The need and urgency for an appropriate response to the escalating climate crisis is absolutely minimal at USD 300 billion per year until 2035, especially given the climate challenges facing low-income countries. Taking inflation into account, the increase in climate finance to USD 300 billion is not as ambitious as it seems at first sight. Furthermore, the contributions of high-income countries have been formulated with greater uncertainty regarding the target. While high-income countries will take the lead, climate finance provided and mobilised by multilateral development banks is likely to be fully counted unless low-income countries opt out. In principle, negotiators from the EU member states could have examined, in consultation with the finance ministers and heads of government, whether they should go even higher than the USD 300 billion that has now been agreed. For the EU, however, joint decisions on strong common energy and climate targets would have been a necessary condition for this. The South-North coalition in favour of more climate action and more finance was unable to prevail against the adverse overall dynamic.
In addition, the COP outcome also lacks quantitative sub-goals for climate change mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. Sub-goals on the one hand would have emphasised the equal importance of these three pillars of the Paris Agreement on the one hand and clearly signalled the allocation of resources and protection for low-income countries on the other. There is now an urgent need to create a reliable source of income for the fund to deal with loss and damage. Ideally, this should be done with a polluter-pays approach. Until then, the countries at risk need political guarantees for a solid minimum cash flow. With regard to qualitative elements, the NCQG decision only calls on bilateral contributors, international financial institutions and multilateral climate funds to improve access, concessionality, and transparency of climate finance on a non-binding basis.
Fortunately, the outlined Baku-Belém Roadmap should lead to an increase in the ambition level of the goal. However, the process required for this remains vague and ultimately a matter of judgement for the COP29 and COP30 presidencies. Innovative financial instruments such as levies on international aviation and shipping and a pioneering coalition to implement the polluter-pays principle are likely to be important for the next goal. The success of the roadmap depends on the willingness of high-income countries to significantly increase adaptation finance and, together with other major emitters, to contribute more to the fund for responding to loss and damage.
Linking the stocktake on the implementation of the NCQG decision with the Global Stocktake and a separate 2030 review is an important part of the decision. It is still unclear how the review will be carried out and how the ambition level will be raised. However, it will allow the urgently needed consultations to continue and exert more pressure on the Parties. This will ultimately enable an appropriate increase in climate finance beyond the level agreed in Baku.
Nationally Determined Contributions almost without ambition
COP29 should provide significant momentum for the development of the next NDCs. On the one hand, by means of a strong response to the global stocktake adopted in 2024 and, on the other, by means of countries announcing ambitious targets.
The specific implementation of the global stocktake could have been negotiated in forums such as the UAE dialogue. However all such negotiations failed in the end. Discussions on the mandate and particularly the opposition of countries that depend on fossil fuel exports blocked any agreement. There was no new call for the stocktake results to strengthen and inform ambitious NDCs compatible with the 1.5°C target (in particular through § 28 and 33). An agreement was postponed to the Bonn interim negotiations in June, unfortunately after the official deadline for new NDCs in February.
With regard to national ambitions, the United Arab Emirates presented comprehensive targets in their new NDC before the COP but lacked any plans to phase out the production or use of fossil fuels. Brazil’s targets include a commitment to reduce emissions by 59–67% by 2035 and to combat deforestation. At the same time, Brazil remains silent on plans to massively expand its fossil fuel infrastructure. Host country Azerbaijan did not present any targets of its own. The EU did not announce any increased ambitions either. The United Kingdom presented an emissions reduction target, the overall NDC will follow: an 81% reduction in emissions by 2035 compared to 1990.
The Troika countries failed to present any 1.5ºC-compatible NDCs and therefore did not meet the target they themselves set. Overall, high-income countries provided a weak impetus and the global stocktake is facing massive opposition. The COP therefore failed to build momentum in favour of ambitious NDCs. However, with Brazil and the United Kingdom, one low-income and one high-income country are sending a cautiously positive signal. Brazil in particular must now use its leadership role as the upcoming COP chair to promote an ambitious implementation of the global stocktake.
Climate change mitigation and the energy transition: emergency brake prevents setbacks
COP29 is the first COP to be held after the first global stocktake. In view of the worsening climate crisis it was to facilitate the rapid implementation of the outcomes of the stocktake. Promoting the agreed energy package (§ 28, 1/CMA.5) and translating it into specific measures was of particular importance. In a best-case scenario, the COP would even have improved the energy package. To do so would have required the adoption of a just, orderly, and equitable economy-wide phase-out of all fossil fuels. It would also have been urgently necessary to put an immediate stop to new coal, oil and gas projects as well as subsidies for fossil fuels.
It quickly became clear that one main aim of COP29 was not to fall behind the Dubai resolutions and to keep the Mitigation Work Programme above water at least until COP30. Despite the efforts of the EU and the Alliance of Small Island States in particular, the Mitigation Work Programme remained politically blocked. In the final straight, the fossil fuel lobby ultimately succeeded in reversing the progress made in Dubai – phasing down fossil fuels was only mentioned indirectly, the additional reference to transitional fuels (fossil gas) in the energy transition and for energy access was to be specifically mentioned in the UAE dialogue text. At the same time, they blocked the reaffirmation of the global targets achieved in Dubai to triple renewable energy capacity, double energy efficiency and transition away from fossil fuels in the energy system, as well as a growth target for electricity storage and grids. In all IPCC scenarios, which (after overshoot) lead to global warming of around 1.5°C, the fossil fuels peak must be reached by 2025. For this reason, some of the countries whose very existence is affected by the climate crisis pulled the emergency brake. They allowed the text to fail in order to at least prevent any setbacks. Negotiations are due to resume in June 2025.
The Dubai Consensus therefore remains intact for the time being. However, the more ambitious COP29 climate change mitigation goal was not reached. The necessary important signals in favour of more ambitious climate action and a consistent energy transition failed to materialise.
Mitigation Work Programme falls short of mandate
Measures to close the ambition and implementation gap by 2030 could have been discussed as part of the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP). However, at this COP, the signatory states once again only agreed on a minimum consensus, which will hardly bring any significant improvements for the process. This means that gas and oil countries, together with China and India, have undermined the MWP and prevented further commitments on their part. The EU and the Alliance of Small Island States had submitted proposals for the implementation of climate change mitigation elements of the global stocktake (§ 18–42) and political signals for 1.5°C-compatible NDCs. They were immediately dismissed by Saudi Arabia, China, and India, among others, with the threat of completely preventing a COP decision on the 2024 MWP. Now the decision contains highly questionable solutions that reflect some of the results of the global dialogues. Although it is essentially positive to emphasise solutions in the decision text, some of those included are very problematic. For example, reference is made to clean and low-emission technologies in the building sector, potentially paving the way for fossil gas heating. What remains is an empty shell of global dialogues and investment-oriented events without any signalling effect for climate policy ambition. The MWP has consequently once again failed to fulfil its mandate to close the existing ambition and implementation gap by 2030.
The Just Transition Work Programme failed to make progress
The Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) was to be made ready for implementation at COP29. However, no consensus was reached here either. Discussions on the topic could not be concluded. They will now be renewed by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation in June 2025 so that they can be adopted at COP30 in 2025.
The Parties clearly wanted to proceed with the work programme, but were unable to agree on fundamental points, such as its scope. An agreement on the pre-determined scope of the work programme even seemed impossible. The latest text version of the work programme also lacked a timetable for its implementation.
There is now a chance of a better result for the Just Transition Work Programme. However, implementation has been delayed and with it the time until the review in 2026. The future of just transition within the UNFCCC is therefore once again being called into question.
The Global Goal on Adaptation: procedural progress, unmet needs and growing global risks
In preparation for the adoption of the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) next year, there were two priorities at COP29. The first was to include support through finance, technology and skills in the Framework for Global Climate Resilience and the second was to launch the decision on adaptation indicators at COP30. The negotiations in Baku got off to a productive start with a focus on technical foundations (including criteria for the indicators). In the second week, delays in the NCQG negotiations were reflected in vague wording on financial resources and the topic of transformative adaptation was postponed. As a result, only procedural progress was made on climate change adaptation, but no content-related progress on the creation of indicators to measure the GGA.
Ultimately, a clear path to COP30 was agreed in Baku. Another milestone was the agreement on the Baku Adaptation Roadmap, which is intended to support the implementation of the GGA beyond COP30. However, while the basic elements of the GGA are gradually taking shape, crucial details and actionable strategies are still missing. Important questions remain unanswered: How will NDCs and NAPs integrate with the implementation of the GGA? How will accountability be ensured for voluntary reporting on adaptation indicators? And how will the NCQG prioritise funds for climate change mitigation and adaptation? Frameworks and roadmaps will be insufficient in the face of severe climate impacts. Parties urgently need to muster the political will for robust plans, financial commitment, and action on the ground. How else can we protect ecosystems and people already affected by the climate crisis? Otherwise, the GGA will become another empty promise in the fight for climate resilience.
An unsuccessful COP for loss and damage
While COP27 and COP28 achieved significant success in supporting the most vulnerable in dealing with loss and damage, COP29 fell substantially short of expectations. Vulnerable people in particular have been left empty-handed, as the NCQG does not include direct commitments to provide finance for loss and damage. This is a missed opportunity to do justice to the Paris Agreement. The agreement had established loss and damage as the third pillar alongside mitigation and adaptation in the UNFCCC negotiations. Theoretically, payments can be made via the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage, but without it being firmly anchored in the goal, the necessary enforcement power is lacking.
There was also no content-related progress on the review of the Warsaw International Mechanism and the reports of its Executive Committee WIM ExCom and the Santiago Network. The decision on the agenda items was postponed to the negotiations in June 2025 as, among other things, there was no agreement on the location of the Santiago Network secretariat (Kenya requested that it be relocated from Switzerland to the Global South). A number of countries in the Global South, including Vanuatu, Kenya, G77+China, and the Alliance of Small Island States, called for a regular gap report on loss and damage. However, countries such as Australia, the USA and the EU did not support this request. They are probably too worried about having to pay for skyrocketing losses as a result of the escalating climate crisis.
There has also been little progress in financing the Loss and Damage Fund: the USD 702 million pledged in 2023 has only been increased by USD 56 million (Sweden approximately 18 million, Australia approximately 32 million, New Zealand approximately 6 million). This is a major setback in building trust between the South and North, as the needs of particularly vulnerable people and regions in the Global South are on a completely different scale. The successes of past COPs are at stake if the fund, which is supposed to be ready for disbursement from 2025, remains so poorly resourced.
Food systems on everyone’s lips
Food systems are massively affected by climate change and at the same time drive climate change due to high emissions. Although they were part of many discussions and initiatives at the COP, there were only a few specific negotiation results. Fortunately, civil society’s commitment to climate action in food systems was higher than ever before.
As expected, the Sharm el-Sheikh Joint Work negotiation strand on implementation of climate action on agriculture and food security only agreed on the further development of an online portal on projects and strategies. The newly presented Harmoniya Climate Initiative for Farmers is intended to co-ordinate existing initiatives for climate-resilient agricultural and food systems. However, its actual impact remains to be seen. Progress was made in the area of methane, although only the waste sector was addressed in a new declaration (including food).
The transformation of our food systems will require more and, in particular, binding emission reduction targets for food systems in the new NDCs. It is likely that this topic will play a far greater role at COP30 in 2025.
Outlook
A swift start to climate diplomacy in 2025?
For many participants at COP29, the question arose as to how the international climate debate can regain momentum. China in particular called for a stronger role for MoCA, the annual ministerial meeting of key countries and negotiating groups initiated in 2017 in response to Trump’s first election. The German government tested the idea of holding the 2025 Petersberg Climate Dialogue in February. As is known, this dialogue is being prepared together with the upcoming COP Presidency in order to generate the necessary momentum for the desired core results.
From Baku to Belém
COP30 will take place in November 2025 in Belém, Brazil. This is where the first full cycle for raising ambition under the Paris Agreement is to be concluded. The focus will be on the question of how the world can achieve a 1.5°C pathway based on the revised NDCs, or at least a pathway that is compatible with the Paris Agreement. The new climate plans should be published by February 2025 at the latest. However, many countries are already showing signs of delay. Unfortunately, COP29 was unable to generate the political momentum for an ambitious further development of the climate targets. Now major emitters such as the EU and China must spearhead ambitious climate plans and set an example. They should promote a climate policy that is as compatible with 1.5°C as possible, foster effective international climate co-operation, and form partnerships with countries of the Global South.
After all at the next COP, President Trump will most likely withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement. However, a country can take part in negotiations up to one year after withdrawing. The US government could therefore use 2025 for disruptive action. Parts of the COP are additionally based on the Framework Convention on Climate Change (not the Paris Agreement); the US government can continue to take part in these negotiations, albeit destructively in a worst-case scenario.
There are high hopes for Brazil as an ambitious and transparent COP host. The country will also take over presidency of the BRICS+. In addition, with the Roadmap to Mission 1.5 the COP Presidencies Troika must promote increasing the ambition. Clarification is also needed before Belém as to how the Baku-Belém Roadmap can actually lead to more climate finance and particularly to the required USD 1.3 trillion. It will then also be necessary to determine how reliable long-term finance can be provided for loss and damage. This is because there is no legal basis for this in the NCQG. To support particularly vulnerable low-income countries in tackling the consequences of climate change, the Global Goal on Adaptation indicators must be established at COP30. The reform of the international financial architecture will also be important as a key opportunity to increase funding for international climate finance, which will reach an important milestone with the Finance for Development conference in Spain in mid-2025.
Author(s)Laura Schäfer, Petter Lydén, Christoph Bals, Lina Ahmed, Katharina Brandt, Lalit Chennamaneni, Felix Domke, David Eckstein, Julia Grimm, Vera Künzel, Kerstin Opfer, Giovanni M. Pradipta, David Ryfisch, Lisa Schultheiß, Rixa Schwarz, Thea Uhlich, Martin Voß |
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CitationSchäfer, L., et al., 2024,Climate Policy in Times of Crisis: Weak Compromises despite Urgent Needs, www.germanwatch.org/en/91843. |